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This paper explores the relationships among fertility, international population 
movements and economic development. The U.N. Population Division estimates that 175 
million people in the world live in a country other than where they were born, which 
represents about 3% of the world population. Most of the world migrants live in Europe 
(32%), Asia (29%) and North America (23%). In general, migrants tend to be young adults 
and between 40 and 60 percent are female.
1 Many of the key issues in the debate on 
immigration are economic.
2 In the economic literature on immigration policy, the potential 
adverse effect on the labour market outcomes of native-born workers  has often been 
emphasised. Less attention, however, has been devoted to the possible benefits of 
immigration. We argue that the connection between migration and growth depends upon 
the circumstances of the receiving and the sending country and on the characteristics of the 
immigrant flow. International migrants are as diverse as their motivations to move. Some 
are settlers, while others move on a temporary basis; some are skilled, while others are 
unskilled. Although the empirical literature on this subject is vast, very few theoretical 
papers have analysed different types of migration within a single framework. One recent 
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1 See United Nations (2002). For a critical review of this report, concerning the data (including the report’s 
headline figure of 175 million migrants!) as well as the analysis, a very interesting reading is Coleman 
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2 Two recent and comprehensive surveys of the literature can be found in Ghatak, Levine and Price (1996) 
and Massey et al (1993).   2
contribution is Wong (1997), who develops an overlapping generations model where 
workers decide optimally about education and migration. By considering only 
homogeneous unskilled workers, however, the author neglects the selection process that 
guides the migration and return migration decisions. Haque and Kim (1995) and Beine et 
al. (2001) develop a similar model with heterogeneous agents, but focus their attention only 
on the case of brain drain. At the other extreme, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) consider only 
the case of return migration. Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000, 2002) study the role of 
imbalances in labour supply and policy differences on international migration and growth. 
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) study the effects of temporary and permanent 
migration in the sending country. By focusing on different types of migration (skilled and 
unskilled, temporary and permanent) and their effects on growth, and by considering 
heterogeneous agents, this paper distinguishes itself from much of the literature.  
  The paper raises another important topic: the relationship between fertility, 
migration and growth. This issue has so far received little attention in the empirical 
literature (see e.g. Lindstrom 2003; Cassen et al 1994, Ribe and Schultz 1980) and even 
less in the theoretical literature (however, see Zhang 2002 for a rural-urban migration case 
and the interesting chapter by Teitelbaum and Russel 1993 for a discussion of the links 
between fertility and migration). The macro long-run correlation between rural to urban 
migration and fertility is unequivocal: when the former increases the latter declines.
3  As 
far as international migration is concerned, demographic differentials are of special 
importance in South to North population movements. High immigration to low-fertility 
countries from countries with high fertility rates poses a number of challenging questions. 
First, what is the nature of the link between fertility and migration? Second, to what extent 
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is the fertility of international migrants itself affected by their mobility? Third, does a self-
selection process operate whereby locational choices reflect pre-migration-formed fertility 
preferences?  Fertility data for foreign-born or foreign nationals are weak, but it is often 
found that migrants who move from higher to lower fertility settings generally have fertility 
rates lower than those of co-nationals who remain at home.
4 This is clearly an important 
policy issue when considering replacement migration as a solution to population ageing in 
developed countries.
5 The underlying reasons for this different fertility could be the 
different relative prices and different income constraints in the new environment which 
may be less conducive to large families, the migrant's cultural adaptation to their new 
setting or, as suggested above, a self-selection process whereby migrants possess fertility 
preferences different from those of the overall population at the origin.
6 Of course, we are 
not arguing that high fertility is a necessary or a sufficient condition for international 
migration - as this is not true, for example, in the case of migration from Eastern to Western 
Europe (both areas of low fertility) - but only that fertility choice affects and is affected by 
migration, together with other variables like schooling of children, medical care and quality 
of life. By considering such variables, we develop a model that allows for return migration 
even though  a reversal of the inter-country wage differential does not occur. 
This paper also represents a contribution to the endogenous growth literature. It 
develops an Uzawa-Lucas (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988) type of model, where  the source of 
growth is the unboundedness of human capital accumulation, but it focuses on an economy 
with labour mobility where labour movements can affect growth rates. This implies that 
policies that affect migration can have growth effects.  
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  The model is set out in Section 2. The issue of the brain drain is analysed in Section 
3. Section 4 considers the migration of unskilled labour. The growth consequences of 
migration are considered in Section 5. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 6. 
 
2. The model 
  We consider a two-country overlapping generations economy, where each 
heterogeneous agent lives two periods, a homogeneous good is produced by a large number 
of competitive firms and output is a function of effective labour. A young agent in period t, 
immediately after birth, inherits the average level of general knowledge (i.e. the human 
capital) in the economy, ht , and decides optimally on the location of his/her residence in 
both periods such that lifetime utility is maximised. Agents are endowed with differing 
abilities: the ability of an individual  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ j  is denoted by 
j δ  and agents are distributed 
according to ability with some density function  ( ) δ f  which is continuous and positive in 
the interval ( )
1 , 1 δ . This distribution is assumed to be the same across countries. Each agent 
divides his/her time in the first period between working and education, and devotes the 
second period to work only. Education is provided free of charge by the government and 
agents take the prevailing wage rate per efficiency unit of labour wt as given. Consumption 
takes place in both periods and credit markets are not considered, so that intertemporal 
consumption smoothing is possible only through the accumulation of human capital. 
  We assume that all agents have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function that 
depends on consumption and quantity and quality of children
7: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ) log( ) 1 ( log log 1 , , nm c c U t t t t φ − + ζ φ β + ζ = +                     (1) 
                                                           
7 The log-linear specification of the utility function in consumption and number of children is not uncommon 
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where ctT ,  is consumption at time T of an agent born in period t, β is the discount factor, n 
is the number of children, m is a parameter reflecting the quality (or survival rate) of 
children which depends on the location of residence and may be influenced by the 
government, andζ is a location externality which takes the value of one if the agents 
consume in their country of birth and a value between zero and one if consumption takes 
place outside that country. Hence ζ summarises all factors which are locationally fixed and 
complementary to consumption, such as social relations, climate, family and friends. Thus 
we allow for the fact that agents may have a stronger preference for consumption at home 
than abroad.
8 
When young, the jth agent faces the following budget constraint: 










t d t t L h h l w L h l w c − δ γ − − τ − + − τ − =                   (2) 
where the subscripts d and f denote domestic and foreign respectively, τ is the rate of wage 
tax and l is the amount of time devoted to education. The term 
j
t L  defines the locational 
choice and can either be one, if the agents stays at home or zero if they move abroad. Thus 
the first part of equation (2) is the budget constraint of an agent who chooses to stay in 
his/her own country and whose income is derived from after-tax wages, 
() ( ) t
j d
t d h l w − τ − 1 1 .  If the agents decide to move abroad, they will face the cost of 
migration, δ γ / t h , assumed to be proportional to their level of human capital and inversely 
related to their ability. This feature captures the idea that more skilled agents can adjust to 
the new environment with less costs and that the cost of migration reflects factors such as 
foregone wages while searching for a job (which is proportional to human capital). Thus 
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the second part of equation (2), which refers to migrants, includes after-tax wages, 
( ) ( ) t
j f
t f h l w − τ − 1 1 , and the cost of migration,  δ γ / t h . 
  In the second period of life the individual faces a similar budget constraint which 
now does not include education: 
() ( ) [ ]
() () [] [] ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( / 1 1
/ 1 ) 1 ( 1
1 1 1 1
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− δ γ − − − + τ −
+ δ − γ − − τ − =
                   (3)  
where q represents the cost of raising children, which is assumed to be proportional to 
human capital and is therefore increasing with time (reflecting the idea, common in the 
literature, that child rearing is a time intensive household activity). As before, the term 
j
t L 1 +  
captures the locational choice in the second period, the term
j j
t h δ γ + / 1 ) 1 (  is the cost of 
(return) migration (now also proportional to the number of children), and b is a parameter 
that reduces agents' productive capacity (because of language and other difficulties 
associated with adaptation) when they work in a country other than their own. The first part 
of this budget constraint refers to an agent living in the home country. After-tax labour 
income is reduced by the cost of raising children, which is proportional to a quality-
adjusted index of fertility,  d
j
dm n  (e.g. the number of surviving children). It also includes 
the cost of return migration if the agent was living abroad when young (i.e. if  0 =
j
t L ). We 
consider this cost as being proportional to the number of (prospective) children in order to 
take into account both the higher costs of moving more people and the various costs 
associated with the adaptation of a larger family. The second part of the budget constraint 
refers to an old agent living in the foreign country. In this case the agent's productivity is 
reduced by the assimilation parameter, b, but only if he/she was in his/her home country in   7
the first period (i.e. if  1 =
j
t L ).
9 Again, the individual will face a cost of migration if not 
living in the foreign country when young (i.e. if  1 =
j
t L ). 
  The key to growth in this economy is the accumulation of human capital. Following 
Lucas (1988), we assume that the efficiency level of labour in the next period depends on 
the fraction of time this period that each worker spends on education. We also include the 
parameter  θ to distinguish the efficiency of education between the home and foreign 
country. 










t L l L l h h − δ θ + δ θ + = +                         (4) 
  The technology of the production sector is described by a constant returns to scale 
production function in effective labour: 
yA h tt =                               (5) 
where A is the marginal product of effective labour. Cost minimisation implies that the 
wage rate is equal to A and therefore constant over time. We allow for the possibility that 
the marginal product of labour is different between countries by assuming that  A A
f λ =  
where  1 ≠ λ  captures differences in technology. Hence, wA t
d =  and  A w
f
t λ = . 
  Finally the government is assumed to operate under a balance budget constraint and 
collects taxes to provide public goods. 
  The model is able to accommodate various types of migration scenario. Permanent 
migration occurs if an agent moves to the host country when young and dies there (i.e. 




t L L ). Brain drain takes place when an agent receives education and works 
in the host country when young and moves abroad after graduation (that is when  1 =
j
t L  
                                                           




t / 1− +  would be equal to 1. If  0 =
j
t L , then the term in square brackets 
would be equal to 1/b thus eliminating the assimilation parameter from the equation.   8
and  0 1 = +
j
t L ). Temporary migration occurs when an agent gets education and works abroad 
when young and then returns to the source country when old (i.e. if  0 =
j
t L  and  1 1 = +
j
t L ). 




t L L . 
  The decision problem of each household is to maximise equation (1) subject to the 
intertemporal budget constraints defined in equations (2) and (3). We begin by considering 
the location of residence as given. The first order conditions are: 
0 / 1 1 , = Ψ + t t c                                        (6) 
0 2 1 , = Ψ + βφ + t t c                             (7) 
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where  wd
t  and wf
t  have been replaced by A andλA respectively, and Ψ1 and Ψ2 are the 
Lagrangean multipliers associated with the constraints (2) and (3). Equations (6) and (7) 
are the optimality conditions with respect to ctt ,  and ctt , +1. Equations (8) and (9) are the 
first order conditions with respect to l and n, equating the marginal benefits and marginal 
costs of an additional unit of time spent on education and an additional child, respectively. 
 
3. Brain Drain 
  In our model, brain drain arises when individuals receive education and work when 
young in the source country but move abroad in the second period and work in the host   9
country.
10 Thus agents live in their own country when young and decide optimally about 
their location of residence after graduation. We wish to compare this situation with the case 
of no migration. From equations (6)-(9), substituting  1 =
j
t L  and  0 1 = +
j
t L  (for the case of 
brain drain), or  1 1 = +
j
t L  (for the case of no migration), we obtain: 
d d
j
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() () () φβ + δ θ
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l                             (12) 
Thus, for the fertility rate of migrants, ndf
j
, , to be lower than that of co-nationals remaining 
in the home country, ndd
j
, , it is sufficient that qm qm ff d d ≥ . Because this is likely to hold, 
given that m increases with economic development and q is not likely to decrease, the 




,, < . The time spent on 
education, l
j
1 , depends positively on the agent's ability,
j δ , on the efficiency parameter,  d θ , 
and on the tax rate, d τ . The solution for relative consumption levels can be derived 
straightforwardly from equations (6)-(9), and will also depend on the location of residence 
in the second period of life:  
() () ( ) [ ]
() A
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1 ,                (13) 
This equation expresses the familiar result that the change in consumption between periods 
depends on the time preference factor β. In addition, an increase in the education 
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efficiency parameter,  d θ , is associated with a reduction in ctt ,  relative to ctt , +1, given that 
agents would prefer to spend more on education in the first period. 
  Given the above, we may write the expressions for the utility obtained under no 
migration and the utility obtained under migration, and find the optimal solution for the 
residence of the old depending on the relative level of utilities. 
() () ( ) []
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1 1 log log 1
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log 1
/ 1 1 1 1 log
1 1 log log log 1
β φ −
+ δ δ θ + γ − − λ δ θ + τ − βφ
+ − τ − + ζ + βφ + =
             (15) 
where  Udd ,  and Udf ,  are the utility levels in the case of no migration and brain drain 
respectively. Whether an interior solution or a corner solution occurs depends on the size of 
the locational parameter, ζ, on the cost of moving,γ, and on the wage advantage abroad, 
( ) b f λ τ − 1 . If () ( ) b f d λ τ − > τ − 1 1  and qq fd ≥  then no migration would occur as the utility 
derived from migration, Udf , , would be less than that when working at home, Udd , , for all 
agents. On the other hand, if  () ( ) b f d λ τ − < τ − 1 1 ,  1 = ζ  and  0 = γ  (i.e. if there is a wage 
advantage abroad, no complementarities between consumption and the location where it 
takes place, and no cost of moving), then all agents would migrate in the second period.  In 
the general case, where wages abroad are higher and the parameters are in some 
intermediate range, some people would migrate and others would stay according to their 
level of ability. It can be shown that, for some intermediate values for the parameters, 
UU dd df ,, >  at  j = 0 and UU dd df ,, <  at  j =1. It can also be shown that Udd ,  and Udf ,  are 
monotonic functions of  j . Hence, there exists a  ( ) j
* , ∈ 01  for which UU dd df ,, = , and   11
UU dd df ,, () ><  if  jj <> ()
* (see Appendix). The term  j
* is therefore the index for the 
individual at the margin who represents the cut-off between migrants and non-migrants.  
  The rationale for the migration of the most skilled lies in the fact that their increase 
in return to the human capital they have acquired is enough to compensate the various costs 
of migration, including the preference for consumption at home. Consequently different 
factors can influence  j
* and hence the average level of human capital that remains in the 
economy, including factors that affect fertility and childbearing. In the Appendix, we show 
that the equilibrium value of  j  increases with the cost of migration,γ, the tax rate of the 
foreign country, f τ , the child rearing costs in the foreign country, q f , and the magnitude of 
() ζ − 1  (i.e. the higher is the location preference). In fact, all these factors reduce the utility 
of moving abroad. Consequently, the equilibrium value of j decreases with the domestic tax 
rate, d τ , the assimilation parameter, b, the technology parameter,λ, the child rearing costs 
in the home country,qd  and the child quality parameter, mf . This is because an increase in 
these parameters will ceteris paribus increase the utility of a migrant. 
 
4. Permanent Migration and Temporary Migration 
  This section focuses on permanent (lifetime) migration and temporary migration 
only, abstracting from brain drain. In our model, permanent migration occurs when workers 
in the home country move to the host country in the first period, receive education, work 
and die there. Temporary migration is when unskilled workers in the source country move 
to the host country when young and get education there, and then decide to return to their 
origin country when old and work (and die) there as skilled workers. Thus we focus on the   12
choice of staying abroad in the second period after having moved when young versus the 
choice of return migration. 
  Although studies of international migration flows suggest the presence of large 
numbers of return migrants,
11 return migration has been the subject of very few papers, 
probably because little is known either conceptually or empirically about the selection 
process guiding this decision. A recent exception is Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) that 
studies optimal migration durations and activity choices (self-employed, salaried employed 
or retired) after return migration using a survey data set of Turkish immigrants to Germany. 
To keep the model simple and more focused we cannot consider this multiplicity of 
activities after returning, so we simplify the choices a migrant faces. Accordingly, return 
migration may result from a reversal of the wage differential of the two countries, as in the 
classical economic argument (and one of the mechanism operating in the aforementioned 
paper by Dustmann and Kirchkamp), or may have been planned as part of an optimal life-
cycle residential location sequence whereby agents accumulate human capital in the host 
country and then return to the source country. Alternatively, it may result from "mistakes" 
in the initial migration decision despite persistently higher wages in the host country, 
changes in policies and other parameters affecting fertility decisions and changes in the 
subjective perception of the location (i.e. changes in ζ over time). From equations (6)-(9), 




t L L  (for the case of permanent migration) and  0 =
j
t L ,   1 1 = +
j
t L  
(for the case of temporary migration), we obtain: 
f f
j
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Hence the conclusions are the same as before, the only difference being that we are now 
talking about return migration. However, return migrants may not have a lower fertility  
rate (n fd
j
, ) than co-nationals staying in the host country (n ff
j
, ) because qm dd  might be well 
below  qm ff . Intertemporal consumption may also be derived from the first order 
conditions and will depend on the locational choice: 
() ( ) ( ) [ ]
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As before, we may compute the utility levels in the two cases: 
() ( )( ) ( ) []
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                    (21) 
A corner solution with permanent migration would emerge if ( ) () d f b τ − > λ τ − 1 1 , qq df ≥  
and  1 = ζ . On the other hand, if  ( ) ( ) d f b τ − < λ τ − 1 1  and  0 1 = γ  then all migration will be 
temporary. As before, it can be shown that for some intermediate values for the parameters, 
UU ff fd ,, >  at  j = 0 and UU ff fd ,, <  at  j =1. Hence migrants may choose to return, 
despite persistently higher wages in the host country because they simply enjoy living and 
consuming in their home country more than in the host country. Also, it can be shown that 
U ff ,  and U fd ,  are monotonic functions of  j . Therefore, there exists a  () j
* , ∈ 01  for which   14
UU ff fd ,, = , and UU ff fd ,, () ><  if  jj <> ()
*. This result implies that reverse migration in 
our model is a process involving the most skilled migrants, i.e. those who can afford the 
various costs of moving.
12 It can be shown that the equilibrium return migration ratio 
() 1− j
*  decreases with the cost of return migration,  1 γ , the tax rate of the home 
country, d τ , the child rearing costs in the home country, qd ,  the location preference 
parameter,  ζ, and the technology parameter,λ. It increases with the foreign tax rate, f τ , 
the child rearing costs in the foreign country,q f  and the child quality parameter, md . 
 
5. Growth Consequences 
  In this section we examine the growth effects on the receiving country and on the 
source country of the three types of migration considered. Let us consider first the effects 
of brain drain on the sending country. Following Haque and Kim (1995), the average level 
of human capital of the parents' generation in period t +1 in the country of emigration can 
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12 For a similar result, see Jasso and Rosenzweig (1988) and Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990). They found 
evidence that the most likely outmigrants are the most skilled workers among the foreign-born population.   15
This is an increasing function of  j
*, i.e. a decreasing function of brain drain. Hence, brain 
drain generates a reduction of the growth rate in the home country. On the other hand, in 
the country of immigration the average level of human capital of old workers in period 
t +1 can be written as: 
()
h
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t                     (25) 
This expression shows that the growth effect of immigration varies over time depending on 
the dynamics of the ratios of the average levels of human capital. For instance, consider a 
case in which the average human capital level of the home country is higher than that of the 
foreign country. Immigration would raise the average level of human capital in the 
destination country, thus contributing to its growth. However, as ( ) hh t
d
t
f /  declines, the 
foreign country's growth rate will also decrease. In the opposite case, of  immigrants with a 
relatively low level of human capital, the growth rate of the immigration country will 




f /  will increase and hence the foreign country's growth rate will also increase. 
Therefore both growth rates converge to some steady state levels where () hh t
d
t
f /  is 
constant. These steady state growth rates depend on the parameters affecting  j
* which we   16
have already considered in our analysis above, such as the after tax wage differential, the 
cost of migration, fertility related variables and location preferences. 
  This analysis can be reversed when considering return migration. If the human 
capital level of return migrants is higher (lower) than that of co-nationals, then the source 
country will experience a higher (lower) growth rate. On the other hand, the foreign 
country's growth rate will diminish if return migrants have a higher human capital level 
relative to the indigenous population. 
 
6. Conclusions 
  We have considered a simple two-country model where economic and demographic 
outcomes are the results of agents' optimisation decisions. Heterogeneous workers, 
endowed with different abilities, choose optimally the timing and length of emigration, 
their education investment, relative consumptions and number of children. It is shown that 
migration may be induced by locational externalities, wage differentials, fertility related 
variables, and human capital considerations. Another issue we have addressed is how 
international migration affects the fertility of migrants themselves, showing why migrants 
might have lower fertility rates than co-nationals who remain at home. 
  We have shown how international labour movements can affect the growth rates of 
economies so that policies that affect migration may have growth effects. In the case of an 
interior solution, the analysis suggests that, if the choice is between brain drain and no 
migration, the most skilled workers are those more likely to migrate. In the same way, 
when considering return migration, the most skilled workers are most likely to be 
outmigrants. Extending our analysis, one could also argue that if all types of migration 
were allowed,  different types of migration could occur at the same time involving different   17
segments of the ability distribution, as is likely to happen in real situations. However, we 
leave this extension to future research. 
  The results of this paper are consistent with the existing empirical literature on 
immigrant fertility compared to that of the native-born population (see, for example 
Stephen and Bean, 1992). The various theoretical mechanism considered in this model are 
similar to those emphasised by other analyses of migration like Haque and Kim (1995) for 
the case of brain drain, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) for the case of return migration and 
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) for the case of temporary and permanent migration 
and their effects on growth. The novelty of our approach is to consider a unified framework 
in which to analyse the effects of the various types of migration and their relationship with 
fertility. 
  Finally, there are other ways in which the analysis could be extended. We would 
like to incorporate a more complex age structure in the model and to find optimal rules for 
the policy variables. We have only focused on the welfare of the current generation because 
the definition of dynastic welfare, when migration is allowed, leaves unresolved conceptual 
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APPENDIX  
A. Derivation of Equilibrium Properties 
Consider the brain drain case. In order to find  j
* set Udd ,  from equation (14) equal to Udf ,  
from equation (15): 
() [] ()
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φ − + φ τ − φ
              (A1) 
It is easy to show that the RHS is an increasing function of 
j δ . Because Udd ,  and Udf ,  are 
increasing monotonic functions of  j  and  Udd , >(<) Udf ,  if j=0 (1), then  j
* represents the 
divide between migrants and non-migrants. All individuals with higher abilities will find it 
convenient to migrate. This analysis can be reversed in the case of equations (20) and (21) 
for the choice between temporary and permanent migration. 
B. Comparative statics 
With regard to brain drain, the following results can be derived after some algebra, where 
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It follows: 
0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0






















                       (A6) 
It is straightforward to derive the other results concerning qd , d τ , f τ  and ζ . 
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An endogenous growth model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous rates of 
fertility is developed to study the relationships between population growth, human capital, 
migration and economic development. A variety of patterns of migration, from the 
migration of the unskilled to the brain drain is considered, where the decision to migrate 
reflects agents' optimising behaviour. The analysis yields implications which accord with 
the empirical evidence on the relationships between demography and development. 
Macroeconomic policy can foster growth by influencing labour mobility through taxation 
and the provision of public goods such as social infrastructure, sanitation, environmental 
control and medical research that affect locational preferences and child quality.  
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